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This thesis has two purposes. First, it attempts to
determine whether the absence of the Cost Accounting
Standards Board (CASB) has given rise to any areas of
contention between contractors and defense agencies and what
those areas might be. Second it evaluates several issues by
reference to data reflecting the opinions and experiences of
industry representatives and Government contract administra-
tors. Data were gathered by the use of two questionnaires.
Results show that there have been some conflicts that
ay be attributable to the disappearance of the CASB,
although the Financial effects of these matters on contract
prices do not appear to be substantial. Recommendations are
presented to alleviate the conflicts identified.
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I . INTRODUCTION
For many years, the United States Government's
procedures for purchasing goods from private industry lacked
a certain amount of order and structure. Although the
Government had the capability to compare the cost of one
good against another, and even the ability to compare the
cost of the same good over time, the ability to justify the
costs attributed to a contract and therefore the capacity to
reliably estimate future contract prices was limited.
In 1970 the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) was
created by Congress to establish principles to achieve
uniformity and consistency in estimating, accumulating, and
reporting of all negotiated contracts that exceeded
$100,000. In 1980 the CASB was allowed to die by the
Congress who created it, leaving behind the product of ten
fruitful years of work.
Since its inception the CASB was one of the most
controversial federal agencies, and its demise did not stem
the flow of disagreement between the parties still
affected by the legacy of the Board.
A. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
Relations between the defense agencies and industrial
suppliers are guided by a series of complex procedures, some
of which are common to every industry and others which
cannot be found elsewhere. This study focuses on one
particular set of rules, Cost Accounting Standards (CAS),
and attempts to analyze the extent to which the
disappearance of the CASB has impacted the defense industry.
The objective of this study is two-fold. First, it
attempts to develop the perspectives of both the defense
agencies and the industrial contractors with respect to the
CAS in general and also their views on the continuing need
for a CASB in general and also their views on the continuing
need for a CASB. To this end, the historical presentation
of the development of the board and the issues that arise
from it will provide a background for evaluation. Second,
the study evaluates these issues with today's perspective in
mind, using present data which reflect the opinions and
experiences of government administrators and industry
representatives. These data were obtained by the use of a
quest ionnaire.
B. STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The basic research question of this project is as
follows: What, if any, problems for industry and/or for
defense agencies have resulted from the abolition of the
CASB? The following subsidiary questions will also be
exp 1 or ed
:
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1) How serious are these problems'
2) Are there any cases in which the absence of the CASB
provides an advantage or a disadvantage to either the
contractor or the government agency?
3) How are contractor and the agencies handling areas of
content i on?
C. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1
.
Limi tat ions .
The opinions expressed by anyone with respect to a
given event are generally biased by his position with
respect to the event. This study attempts to explain
positions both of the defense contractors and of various
agencies of government.
Although an attempt has been made to be as
comprehensive as possible, space and time have prohibited
this study from pursuing and analyzing every issue that has
been expressed by those consulted. Only the major problem
areas have been presented and explored.
2. Assumpt ions .
This study assumes that the reader has a general
knowledge of or familiarity with basic cost accounting
principles. It also assumes that the reader has a broad
understanding of the defense procurement process, with
particular emphasis on the roles of the CAS on defense








This study has been organized in an effort to answer
the basic research question sys teiat ica 1 1 y . Chapter 1
introduces the subject matter and describes the manner in
which the study will proceed. Chapter II provides a
historical analysis of cost accounting in the defense
industry environment and emphasizes the reasons for the
creation of the CASB, its role in the defense procurement
process and the issues that have come to light since it went
out of business. Chapter III presents the salient issues
that were gathered initially and which became the framework
around which the study was structured. Chapter III also
presents the methodology used for developing the research
questionnaires used in the study. Chapter IV introduces and
analyzes the data and findings from the questionnaires used
in this research. Conclusions and recommendations of this
study are contained in Chapter V.
2. Me thodo 1 ogy .
a. Literature Search.
A search of the literature was conducted in the
Naval Postgraduate School Library, and a custom bibliography
was obtained from the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE), Ft. Lee, Virginia. Additionally, many
10
articles and references were discovered during the course of
conducting interviews.
b. Interviews.
Due to the large number of possible issues, the
scope of the thesis was focused by means of a limited series
of personal interviews, conducted at the onset of the
research, with representatives of industry, Department of
Defense (DoD), Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Interviewees who were personally involved with policy making
and the administration of CAS in the post-CASB environment
were sought. The interviews were unstructured, since the
object was to elicit issues that would focus the study.
This approach allowed the researcher to direct questions to
the specific strengths and interests of the subject.
Interviews were taped; however, subjects were assured that
their remarks would not be specifically attributed to them.
It was felt that anonymity allowed the subjects to express
their views on the topic frankly. Appendix A is a list of
the personal interviews conducted.
c. Questionnaires.
After the issues were identified during the
interview process, two questionnaires were prepared to
address substantially the same issues--one from the point of
view of a government contract administrator and the other
11
from that of the comptroller or chief financial officer of a
defense contractor. The questionnaires were then set to a
random sample of defense contractors and to a selected
sample of government defense contract administrators. The
preparation and distribution of the questionnaires will be
fully addressed later. The data analyses contained in this




. DEVELOPMENT OF COST ACCOUNTING
For a very long time the United States Government
conducted business with all its suppliers at a level not
consistent with the role of the mu 1 1 i -bi 1 1 ion industry that
it had become. The Government's knowledge and understanding
of industry's cost accounting systems and practices needed
improvement.
A. HISTORIC REVIEW
In the 1950' s and 1960's defense contract cost
accounting issues were settled by using one of the
guidelines available, such as the Internal Revenue Code and
Regulations, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and section
XV of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR).
However, there were several weaknesses in all these
guidelines. For example, GAAP's chief concerns were
accurate financial reporting and the precise determination
of net income. Therefore, they were not suited to serve the
procurement process. The Internal Revenue Code and
Regulation's purpose was to implement tax laws and raise
revenues; so, its approach was not particularly helpful in
justifying costs allocated to contracts. The SEC again was
concerned with the financial reporting to third parties and
its focus was on the whole corporation, not on an individual
13
contract. Of all the available guidelines, section XV of
ASPR was instituted to provide general cost accounting
guidance and procedures for defense contracts, but it relied
heavily on GAAP and IRS pronouncements and it also lacked
specific criteria for alternate accounting principles and
methods. [13
B. INCEPTION OF THE COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
The birth of the CASB is usually attributed to Admiral
Hyman G. Rickover. Admiral Rickover repeatedly stressed to
both houses of Congress that "the lack of uniformity in the
cost systems employed by industry was the primary deficiency
in government related accounting." C21 Due to this
deficiency, the government did not have the means to compare
and analyze cost data between contracts and even between
per iods
.
Admiral Rickover, whose last assignment was as Director
of the Naval Reactors Program, was at this time involved in
one of his many confrontations with industry. As he was
known to do, he took his fight to the Congress, where he
presented testimony recommending the establishment of
uniform accounting standards for all defense contractors, to
prevent the loss of public funds through what he termed
"accounting manipulations". During his presentation he
provided arguments and figures supporting a potential
14
savings to the government of about two billion dollars per
year, attributable entirely to the use of uniform cost
standards. C3]
Because of the Admiral's tenacity and also largely due
to the mood of the times, the Congress was convinced that
the lack of systematic and codified cost accounting
standards increased procurement costs, permitted excessive
contractor profits, and limited the Government's ability to
procure weapon systems in an efficient manner. So, in 1968
the House of Representatives directed the Comptroller
General to formulate uniform cost accounting standards.
This mandate was modified in the Senate and the law finally
stated
:
The Comptroller General, in cooperation with the Secretary
of Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget. . .(to) undertake a study to determine the
feasibility of applying uniform cost accounting standards
to be used in all negotiated prime contracts and sub-
contracts procurements of more than $100,000. C4]
By 1970 GAO had completed the study and reported that,
although there were significant objections in many different
quarters, it had determined that implementation of a uniform
set of cost accounting standards was feasible. C5] So, on
August 15, 1970, a comprehensive change to the Defense
Production Act of 1950 created the CASB as an independent
congressional agent. The law in part reads: "The board is
authorized to make, promulgate, amend and rescind rules and
15
regulations for the implementation of cost accounting stan-
dards. . . ."[6] The act was signed into law by President
Richard M. Nixon, who stressed the need for Congress to
amend the law as soon as possible and transfer the Board to
the executive branch.




The scope of objectives of the CASB included
enhancing uniformity, consistency, and comparability in cost
accounting data, while maintaining neutrality as to the
interests of the Government and contractor. The fact that
the Board was a government entity posed some problems
regarding the neutrality issue. The composition of the
Board itself has some answers to the problem; the rest of
the solution was left to be answered by the process employed
by the Board in creating and promulgating Cost Accounting
Standards.
2. Composi t ion
The issue of the CASB residing in the legislative
branch was one of the most heatedly debated ones. The Board
an agency of the Congress, was given a regulatory
responsibility that some argued belonged in the executive
branch.
16
Another of the frequent objections to the CASB was
the fear of government appointing self-serving members, who
would look to lower the price of defense contracts at the
expense of private industry's interests. This was one of
the first myths that the Board attempted to destroy in an
effort to establish its neutrality.
By law the Board was composed of five members with
background ranging from government, the accounting
profession, and industry. [7] The Board was headed by the
Comptroller General, Mr. Elmer Staats, and set up an
elaborate system of reviews to ensure that the standards it
provided would be fair, and, most of all, that all of the
parties affected by the standard would have a chance to
express their points of view before the standard was
published. This in no way assured that one's view would
prevail, but, at the very least, it provided some measure of
credibility to the program. C8]
D. THE PROCESS AND PROCEDURES
The CASB explained publicly its process as follows:
The process which resulted in the promulgation of a cost
accounting standard was characterized by an in-depth study
of the subject and by participation of interested parties.
The board used techniques and resources which were appro-
priate to the subject at hand. (They included) selection
of a topic. . . , research of the existing situation. . .,
evaluation of benefits and costs. . ., promulgations
. . ., congressional consideration. . ., continuing re-
view. . ., and interpretation. C9
1
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The actual process employed by the CASB in promulgating
standards followed very closely the description presented by
the Board. As was mentioned earlier, the Board consisted of
five members who met once a month to deliberate on items on
an agenda. The muscle behind the decision making body of
the CASB was a group of about 35 professional and clerical
staffers. The professional staff members were specialist in
individual cost accounting areas, and they prepared and
submitted papers on items of interest for the Board's
agenda. From these items papers, selected proposals were
further refined by the staff and then were reviewed and
polished by the Board. These then became proposed standards
and were issued as advance copy for comments by various
groups of interested parties, such as the FASB, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), several
industry associations, the Federal Government Accountants
Association (FGAA), and a number of companies and
individuals. Then the proposed standard was published in
the Federa 1 Register and comments from all sources were
received, discussed and considered. After any revisions
were made, the standard was promulgated again in the Federa
1
Register . C8] If Congress did not reject it within 60 days
of continuous Congressional session, the standard attained
the full force and effect of law. [10]
18
The process used by the Board had some similarities to
the one used by the accounting profession's own standard-
setting board, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB). And although there were many similarities, also
there was one striking difference; the CASB's standards had
the full force and effect of law. The FASB on the other
hand depended on a broad consensus among accountants and
industry to make its standards effective. This major
difference provided the CASB with an advantage that,
although the board tried to downplay, many considered an
unfair unilateral force in defense contract
administration. [8]
If one follows closely the process used by the CASB, it
is easy to deduce that the Board was not in the business of
publishing large volumes of standards, if for no other
reason than the long time involved with the process. the
evidence bears this out. In the ten years that the board
was in operation it managed to produce a total of 19
standards, and in every case the board employed the same
meticulous and determined approach towards the goal. There
is no evidence that the CASB was under any timetable, and
the time that it took to produce each of the standards
varied normally in proportion to the opposition that it
developed as the process started. Appendix B has
encapsulated versions of the 19 standards published by the
CASB.
19
E. ATTITUDES AND FEELING
Early in its life the CASB understood well its own
significance. Comptroller General Elmer Staats, Chairman of
the CASB said
. . .The Board is acutely conscious of the broad impact it
may have on the accounting profession and business
activity in general, as well as the more direct impact on
companies subject to its promulgations. [ ill
The Board, looked at from a detached point of view, appeared
insignificant among the giants of government bureaucracies.
However, very few other entities wielded the power and had
the impact potential of the CASB. So, as was expected, all
parties affected by the CAS had definite feelings about the
CASB.
1 . Industry Attitudes
Even before the days of the CASB, when the
Department of Defense (DoD) in the late 1950*3 set out to
revise some accounting principles in Section XV of the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR), industry's feelings
were quickly made known. One industry association
summarized these feelings in a position paper, stating that
industry considered the cost principles detrimental to the
buyer-seller relationship. Further, it asserted that the
principles promoted an adversarial relationship, which had
proven to be inefficient in the conduct of a complex
activity. The industry association recommended that the
20
cost principles be simplified by removal of all detailed
guidance and instructional material related to
determinations of the reasonableness of elements of cost.
This point, coupled with the notion that, whenever industry
becomes involved with government regulation, it is always to
the detriment of industry's profits, became the focus of the
attitudes of private industry toward uniform cost accounting
rules. [12]
Shortly after the CASB became operational its Executive
Secretary stated that, due to the effort of the Board
to minimize the inherent mistrust of industry toward the
Board, as well as the extensive attempts to enhance
involvement of industry representatives in the decision
making process, the attitudes of industry could be
classified in two distinct categories. The first were those
of industry associations which seemed to have adhered to the
original beliefs and still viewed the CASB as a unilateral
and even capricious body. Second, the views of some
individual contractors, in sharp contrast to the views of
the associations, reflected a constructive approach to the
research and development of standards. From within the CASB
both position were thought to be useful, the position of the
individual contractor for obvious reasons, and the position
of the associations were regarded as helpful since, as the
executive Secretary expressed
21
(The industry associations). . .are a valuable sounding
board in the development of cost accounting standards.
The associations give us the most negative attitude
possible. Ue believe that if we can deal with the
problems included in this worst possible case we have gone
a long way toward practical solutions to problems that
exist at individual contractor's plants. [12]
2. The Account ing Profess i on' s_Att i tudes
During the hearings leading to the creation of the
CASB it was noted that the accounting profession placed its
emphasis on principles related to financial reports to
stockholders. Problems concerning cost accounting had
always received very low priority within the profession.
The AICPA's concern was that, to avoid conflict between CAS
and the larger body of generally accepted accounting
principles, it would be highly desirable to draw on the
services of practicing public accountants who were well
informed as to the cost principles used in industry.
Another concern was with the use of the term "uniform cost
accounting standards". The term "cost accounting
principles" was recommended instead. However, the AICPA
withdrew this objection at a later date. The profession at
large was generally concerned with financial accounting and
paid relatively little attention to cost accounting issues.
At one point a committee of the AICPA discounted the work of
the CASB as that of a sma 1 1 group o people concerned with a
very narrow field. The profession's lack of interest is
worthy of note when one realizes that defense procurement,
22
contractors, handling more than 25,000 contracts at an
annual cost exceeding $30 billion. [12]
Other professional associations created liaison
committees with the CASB. However, the CASB frequently
complained that, regardless of the effort it made to obtain
advanced cooperative assistance, the best they could get was
criticism, without positive input, after the drafts were
published in the Federal Register . Some help was obtained
from the Financial Executives Institute (FEI), once the FE1
conceded that the standards were imminent and realized that,
since it was going to have to live with the product of the
Board, it had best turn its accounting expertise toward
assisting the Board in the development of practical, useful,
and equitable standards.
There were two organizations from which the Board
expected some help but which, in the opinion of the CASB
Executive Secretary, were not very cooperative. First was
the American Accounting Association (AAA), which is an
organization composed primarily of university professors.
Even though the Executive Secretary felt that way about the
participation of AAA, Dr. Robert Williamson chairman of the
Committee on Cost Accounting Standards of the AAA, said that
he saw n . . .the creation of the CASB as a logical step in a
historical chain of events. [133 He also stated that he
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considered the standards promulgated by the Board to be the
product of a much better process than any previous semi-
secret or ad-hoc procedure. C 13 ] The other organization
which disappointed the Executive Secretary was the Federal
Government Accountants Association (FGAA). Although
originally there was a strong interest manifested by it,
this quickly waned and it did not provide the support that
was expected. C 12]
3. Government At t i tudes
The Government agencies original position towards
CAS can best be summarized by reading what Admiral Rickover
expressed in his keynote address at the Annual Symposium of
the FGAA just two months before Congress created the CASB.
He stated that, in the 1968 Senate hearing which culminated
in the requirement for a GAO study of the feasibility of
cost accounting standards, the DoD claimed that adequate
standards already existed, and GAO hedged on the issue. [14]
However, this negative attitude in government
changed dramatically and the Board obtained valuable help
from agencies such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency,
Defense Logistic Agency (DLA), NASA, the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), the General Service Administration (GSA)
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
One of the salient arguments that the Board received
form several sources dealt with timing. On one hand the
Board was chartered by Congress to proceed with the task at
hand and to provide a progress report two years after it's
24
birth. On the other hand, the CASB received advice from
industry groups, ensuring that a very slow and deliberate
pace be used in the creation of standards. In response the
CASB stated that it would continue to seek advice from
various organizations in industry, the accounting
profession, and government. However, it made it be known
that it did not expect any delays in the promulgation of
standards, even if such advice was slow in appearing. [12]
F. OTHER BOARD FUNCTIONS
Up to now, the discussion has focused on the primary
function of the CASB, that is the research, development and
promulgation of Cost Accounting Standards to be employed in
the implementation of negotiated government contracts.
However, from it's inception, the CASB performed several
other functions which were considered to be vital to the
charter of the Board.
To effectively manage the complex world of cost
accounting within it's purview, and as directed by law, the
Board moved to ensure consistency by requiring contractors
to disclose their cost accounting practices. Another of the
functions of the Board was to continue monitoring issues
after standards were promulgated, to review the
effectiveness of the standards. This process proved to be
valuable, since it stressed a continuing dialogue between
25
the CASB and those parties most directly affected by its
work. The CASB also provided a knowledgeable body to offer
interpretations of its standards whenever a disagreement
between an agency and a contractor erupted. Finally, the
Board was also directed by law to review cases of waivers
of the Cost Accounting Standards for specific firms. [81
G. MAJOR PROJECTS OF THE CASB
The Board, in an attempt at managing the very many
complex areas involved in cost accounting, arrived at five
major projects. The first of these projects concerned the
disclosure statements. As a condition to participate in
negotiated contracts in excess of $100,000, contractors were
now to be required to disclose their current cost accounting
practices and to follow the disclosed practices
consistently. Changes were to be allowed. However, if a
change increased the price of a contract, this increase
could be disallowed by the Government.
The second project the Board needed to study was the
consideration of exemptions. This project was prescribed by
the legislation itself, and the CASB needed to consider what
factors should be weighed in setting exemption policies.
The third project concerned the examination of
contractor's records to ensure compliance and consistency.
The points that the CASB needed to consider at this stage
were as fol lows:
26
Uho should make the examination?
How often should contractors be examined?
What should be the scope of the examination?
Uho should receive the reports of the exam?
What form should that report take?
The next major area was the development of cost
accounting terminology. This was needed to facilitate
internal communications and eventually to enhance
understanding with the outside world, since outside parties
would have to deal with the standards promulgated in the
language of the Board.
Finally, the most time consuming and important project
was the promulgation of Cost Accounting Standards. The
Board staff, after studying the feasibility study performed
by GAO, arrived originally at 150 subjects that could lead
to standards. Of the 150 subjects, an initial group of
eight was selected for further study, since these were
highlighted as significant problem areas. The eight areas
identified were these:
1. Reducing the instances in which like items of cost are
improperly charge or double counted.
2. Improving consistency between proposals and actual
cost performance.
3. Requirements to identify and segregate unallowable
costs.
4. Determination of an equitable base period for the
allocation of cost to work performed.
27
5. Appropriate handling of credits related to costs
previously charged to contracts.
6. Research as to the various methods used to compute and
charge depreciation.
7. Research into the appropriate method of accumulate and
charge general and administrative expenses.
8. Consideration of the cost of capital. [15]
H. THE DEMISE OF THE CASB
When Public Law 91-379 was enacted it did not contain a
"sunset" provision to establish a date when the CASB was to
be terminated. This led some people to believe that the
Board would continue to operate in perpetuity. However,
during the budget hearings in 1979, Congressman Adam
Benjamin of Indiana, Chairman of the House Legislative
Appropriations Subcommittee, started questioning how much
longer was the Board needed to complete its task. Mr.
Staats was able to convince him that the Board still had
work to do and that the original estimate of five to seven
years had been overly optimistic. Thus, Congress provided
CASB with operating funds for fiscal year 1979-80. During
the next budget cycle Congressman Benjamin again asked the
same question, but this time the Chairman of the CASB was




.the objectives of the Cost Accounting Standards Board
will have been accomplished. There is not need for its
continued existence. Compliance monitoring and regulatory
clarifications is a legitimate and traditional function of
the executive branch. . . . Thus the Committee recommends
termination of the CASB. [16]
After ten years of hard work and significant
accomplishments, the CASB's funding was eliminated from the
Congressional Budget and the Board effectively died on
September 30 of 1980. The CASB had managed to operate with
a relatively small staff and an annual budget which never
exceeded *2 nil 1 ion--a bargain by any Washington measure.
Even after the demise of the CASB, Elmer Staats, the
chairman of the Board and its most vocal supporter,
continued to plead for the transfer of the Board's
responsibilities to 0MB so that simplifying and modifying
the standards, granting waivers on individual contracts,
establishing exemptions and possibly creating new standards
could continue. However, his attempts were not successful
and, after his retirement in March of 1981, Congress
designated GAO as the overseer of CAS a condition that
remains until now.
I . DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE CASB
Since the demise of the CASB several attempts have been
made to reinstate the Board but the idea has not found many
advocates.
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In 1983 DoD started a new initiative by getting the
Justice Department to express the opinion that DoD may
"adopt, reject, or grant exceptions" £17] to the CAS. This
opinion was based on a Court of Claims ruling that expressed
the right of DoD to adopt CAS or any other valid standard
into its procurement regulations. From this position DoD
moved to create a new CASB within the department, supported
by a Working CAS Committee. This initiative drew loud
complaints from industry, as well as from GAO, which argued
that DoD was far too close to the issues to exercise
neutrality in the amendment of the CAS. GAO also argued
that DoD lacked the personnel and experience required to
produce a set of standards which could match the quality of
the CASB products. C 18]
The initiative of DoD also lead to motions in Congress.
Congressman LaFalce of New York, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House of
Representatives Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Committee, was convinced of the need for a body to
administer the CAS. He, therefore, introduced a bi 1 1 that
would have created a new CASB that closely paralleled the
previous Board with one major difference. In the new Board
the members were to be appointed by the President of the
United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.
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Due to a shortened session in 1984 the bi 1 1 did not advance
any further. [16]
As of this writing (1987) Congressman LaFalce has
reintroduced the bill. At the same time DoD is proceeding
with its plans to administer and amend the CAS by making
modifications to its procurement regulations.
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III. ISSUES AND METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The presentation thus far has focused on developments in
the arena of cost accounting. As mentioned before, these
developments gave rise to a set of standards that must be
followed by corporations that have negotiated defense
contracts in excess of $100, 000. C 19] Although, the
standards produced by the CASB have a great deal of
congruency with acceptable accounting principles, the Board
and its projects never failed to raise conflicts throughout
its existence. The issues raised have been well documented
in the accounting literature. Examples of some of these
issues are listed below:
1. The tendency of the standards to mandate specific
practices in an effort to curb specific abuses.
2. The implementation of CAS without a proper cost/
benefit analysis.
3. The need for education and training concerning the
standards.
4. The concept of a governmental board promulgating the
CAS. [20]
The disappearance of the CASB did not stop the flow of
issues and concerns from all the parties affected; it rather




After a review of the available literature, it was
determined that the focus of the study should be on a few
significant issues that had been raised. In an effort to
find an appropriate focus for the study without arbitrarily
restricting it, the author originally established
communications with the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA). After several phone contacts it was decided that
the best way to obtain a set of current issues would be by
contacting the CAS Policy Group attached to the Defense
Acquisition Regulation Council, since they were already
dealing with the standards in the absence of the Board.
After initial phone conversations, several face-to-face
interviews were scheduled and conducted. In an effort to
obtain views from industry also, members of the Aerospace
Industry Association of America (AIA) were contacted and
interviewed. Appendix A lists the interviews conducted.
2. Hethodo 1 ogy
The interviews were conducted in Washington D.C. on
the 20th and 2ist of January 1987. The subjects were
initially briefed on the overall purpose of the research and
were informed that the reason for the interview was
to highlight important issues that would be used in the
construction of a set of questionnaires to be distributed
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both to defense industries and to government administrators
of defense contracts. The interviews were taped. However,
the subjects were assured that the comments made would not
be directly attributed to them. It was felt that anonymity
allowed the subjects to express their views on the topic
frankly. The interviews were kept unstructured, since their
purpose was to gather issues. this technique allowed the
researcher to guide the interviews towards areas in which a
given subject appeared to be either particularly
knowledgeable or very interested. The method also allowed
issues that had not surfaced during the preceding literature
search to enter into the interview, since the subjects were
not constrained to answer to a formatted questionnaire.
3. I ssues
The majority of the issues that were presented
throughout all interviews revolved around the fact that the
CAS were written to deal with a dynamic set of
circumstances. However, since the demise of the Board, the
CAS have remained static while the defense contracting
environment has continued to change. These changes have
created several areas of conflict. The most salient
issues—which are the ones pursued by the study--are
presented in the following paragraphs.
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a. Pensions
Issues related to accounting for pension costs
have not been relegated solely to the world of cost
accounting. The FASB recognized that accounting for
pensions, especially defined benefit plans, needed some
improvements and, to provide this improvement, the FASB
promulgated statement number 87 in 1985. [21] In the area of
cost accounting, a concern was voiced over the handling of
over f uncled pension plans and also the disposition of
proceeds from discontinued or terminated pension plans. The
following two arguments were expressed with regards to the
issue: First, if the Government paid a portion of the cost
of a defined benefit pension plan and if the plan is
overfunded, the Government paid more than actual cost. So
an adjustment should be made to reimburse the Government for
the additional money it contributed. The opposing
argument is that any gains made in a pension plan are the
product of wise investments made by management and,
therefore, the gains are just profits belonging to the firm.
b. Insurance
CAS A16 prescribes that, in measuring actual
losses where the firm is se 1 f- insured,
the amount of the loss to be recognized currently shall
not exceed the present value of the future payments,
determined by using a discount rate equal to that
prescribed for settling such claims by the State having
jurisdiction over the claim. If no rate is prescribed by
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the State, then the rate shall be equal to the interest
rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. . . .
C221
The Board promulgated CAS 416 without considering that some
states provided a rate considerably lower than the market
rate in an effort to discourage employers from making lump-
sum payments to settle accidental liability claims. The
states' action was an attempt to prevent the injured party
from wasting the lump-sum payment and subsequently becoming
a dependent of the state welfare system. So, for this
reason some people believe that the use of these low
discount rates to determine costs to be allocated to
government contracts is unreasonable.
c. General and Administrative Costs
There were two issues raised with respect to the
allocation of G&A costs. One of the issues is the problem
encountered with the distribution of costs to contracts when
a company realigns its business segments. Some of these
realignments are due to shifts in the company's lines of
business or due to mergers with an acquisitions of other
companies. In either case there is a possibility that these
changes may affect the G&A rate applicable to defense
contracts. The second issue is that of a firm altering the
G&A cost pool to all the contracts it holds. Changes of
this nature are allowed as long as they do not increase the
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the explicit consent of the Government. C 23
]
d. Waivers
In some instances, contractors or subcontractors
may refuse to accept contract awards with CAS provisions.
In these rare circumstances, if the contracting officer
determines that it is impractical to obtain the goods or
services from any other source, the CASB's regulations state
that, following the request of the head of a federal agency,
The Board may waive all or any part of the requirements of
(the CAS) with respect to a contract or subcontract to be
performed within. . .(or) outside the United States by
(either) a domestic. . .(or) foreign concern. [24]
Since the demise of the CASB, with no agency
apparently authorized to grant waivers, a critical situation
arose with respect to the Space Shuttle Program. Thiokol
Corp. is the prime contractor for Space Shuttle solid rocket
motors and Kerr McGee Chemical Corp. is a first tier
subcontractor to Thiokol, supplying ammonium perchlorate
(AP) for use as a solid fuel oxidizer. AP is a critical
material in the program and had to be procured in sufficient
quantities to support the Space Shuttle launch schedule.
Kerr McGee was one of only two qualified suppliers of AP.
Kerr McGee had not been subject to CAS but, because of the
company's projected growth, it would be required to comply
with CAS under its next subcontract with Thiokol. When the
subcontractor refused to accept an award subject to CAS,
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NASA faced a crisis in that neither of the existing
suppliers of AP could alone meet the estimated increase in
AP requirements, nor could a new supplier be qualified in
time to meet the need. Kerr McGee agreed to invest
corporate funds to increase its capacity to meet the
requirements of NASA, provided it was relieved in advance of
the requirements to comply with CAS. NASA found that delays
in Space Shuttle launch schedules would have an unacceptable
effect on the nation's space and defense efforts. So, based
on these needs Kerr McGee was granted waivers to the CAS.
C163 This authority is conferred by Public Law 85-804,
which, among other things,
empowers the President to authorize Departments and
agencies exercising functions in connections with the
national defense to enter into contracts or into
amendments or modifications of contracts. . .without
regard to other provisions of law. . .whenever he deems
that such action would facilitate the national defense. .
. . [25]
Further, Executive Order No. 10789 directs heads of agencies
n
. . .to exercise authority conferred by the Act. n C26]
The key issue with respect to waivers is whether
the explicit original authority, found in the CASB's
regulations, should be delegated to the heads of agencies or
whether the present arrangement, where this authority has to
be inferred from Public Law 85-804 and Executive Order No.
10789 in terms of National Defense, is satisfactory.
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e. Capitalization of Tangible Assets
CAS 404 provides a $1000 monetary limit, over
which expenditures for tangible assets must be
capital ized. C27] In February 1973, when CAS 404 was
promulgated, the original monetary limit prescribed was
$500. At that time the GNP deflator stood at 105.8.
Shortly before going out of business, in March 1980 the CASB
amended CAS 404 to set a new limit of $1000. The GNP
deflator then stood at 178.5. One of the issues that has
surfaced is the need to raise the limit again in order to
recognize the continuing effect of inflation. In 1987 the
GNP deflator stands at 225.9. C28]
f. A New CASB
The issue that attracted the most comments
during the interview process was that of the need for a body
to administer the CAS. The opinions expressed at the time
ranged from those who believed that there is a need for a
body empowered to perform all the functions previously
attributed to the CASB to the other extreme that claims that
there is no need for a Board. Somewhere in between the two
positions there exist a number of opinions as to the
placement of the Board, the scope of its functions and its






After a careful review of the documentation found in
the literature and the issues highlighted during the face-
to-face interviews, two questionnaires were designed to
collect information about the frequency of occurrence and the
relative seriousness of each of the issues raised. The
questionnaires' formats and perspectives were designed to
cover the same basic issues, with one questionnaire being
geared towards the opinions of the defense industry and the
other, towards those of government contract administrators.
The first questionnaire was directed to the comptroller of
each organization selected. The second was sent to Chiefs
of Contracts at the Defense Contract Administration Services
Plant Representative Offices (DCASPROs), and the Corporate
Administrative Contracting Officers (CACOs). A cover letter
was attached to provide a brief overview of the research
effort, to acknowledge the prospective respondent and their
assistance, and to assure anonymity in the data analysis and
in the thesis. A stamped return envelope was provided to
expedite the questionnaire's return. The cover letter and
the questionnaires appear in Appendix C.
2. Samp 1 e_Se lections
A total of two hundred defense contractors were sent
copies of the first questionnaire. The sample was selected
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at random from the current listing of DoD contractors
receiving negotiated contract awards of $10 million or
more- [29] Prior to the sample selection, all listed
educational and non-profit organizations were deleted from
consideration- This was done in order to concentrate on
business corporations involved in defense production. The
second questionnaire was mailed to 105 elements of the
Defense Contract Administration Service. This sample was
not selected at random. Instead, a copy of the
questionnaire was sent to all DCASMAs, DCASPROs and CACOs
listed on the DoD directory of contract administration
service components . £30]
3. He t hod s of Ana lysis
Upon receipt, each envelope was segregated into a
"industry" or "government" questionnaire file. The
completed questionnaire was reviewed, responses were
recorded, missing data were noted, voluntary comments were
highlighted and the data were compiled and prepared for
analysis. A subjective analysis of the data was conducted,
since the issues being investigated did not lend themselves
to rigorous statistical analysis. Simple frequency analysis
is provided on each question in the data analysis section.
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IV. PRESENTATION OF THE DATA
A. RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES
As was mentioned previously, the study used two
questionnaires addressing basically the same issues to
gather information. To enhance clarity the questionnaire
mailed to the comptrollers of defense companies will be
called the "industry questionnaire". The other
questionnaire, which was mailed to government contract
administrators, will be called the "government
quest ionnai re"
.
The industry questionnaire was mailed to 200 defense
companies. Fifty-three responses were received, for a gross
response rate of 26.5%. Five responses, however, were
returned incomplete. Three specific reasons for incomplete
responses were offered:
(1) Government contracts were obtained through bids and
the company does not become involved in cost type
contracts.
(2) The company did not have a significant volume of
government contracts.
(3) Company policies prevented information release.
Completed industry questionnaires, with minimal if any
missing data, were received from 48 respondents; these form
the basis for the industry data analysis. This is a usable
response rate of 24%.
42
The government questionnaire was mailed to 105 Defense
Contract Administration Service elements. Fifty-seven
responses were received, for a gross response rate of
54.29%. Four responses were returned incomplete. Two
reasons for incomplete responses were as follows:
(1) The office dealt with small business contractors who
were not subject to CAS,
(2) The office is a hardware and service office with no
input in the area of the questionnaire.
Completed questionnaires, with minimal if any missing data,
were received from 53 respondents; these form the basis for
the government data analysis. This is a usable response
rate of 50.48%.
B. PENSIONS
1 . Terminat ion_of _Pens ion P 1 ans
The first group of questions was designed to provide
data with respect to the frequency with which pension plans
were terminated by defense companies and also the impact the
terminations may have on the costs allocated to government
contracts.
The questions included in this area and the
responses received are as follows
Question 1. (Industry) Has your company terminated a
pension plan?
YES = 3 (6.25%)
NO = 45 (95.75%)
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Question 1- (Government) Has any of the contractors you
deal with terminated a pension plan?
YES = 12 (22.64*)
NO = 38 (71.70%)
DON'T KNOW = 3 (5.66%)
Question 2. (Industry) If so, did the termination of the
plan affect the cost allocated to any government contract?
YES = 2 (66.67%)
NO = 1 (33.33%)
Question 2. (Government) If yes, have your contracts
been adjusted or have you sought any adjustments after
contractors terminated pension plans?
YES = 11 (91.67%)
NO = 1 (8.33%)
Both industry and government respondents who stated
that pension termination had affected contract costs were
asked for the magnitude of such changes, both as dollar
amounts and as percentages of total contracts. Only limited
responses were received for these questions, as will appear
in the following discussion.
Of the 48 industry respondents, three companies
reported that they had terminated a pension plan. One of
them reported an adjustment of $430,000, equivalent to less
than 1% of its total government contracts. The other two
companies were unable to provide information as to the
magnitude of the adjustments, in one case because the matter
was still in litigation.
Of the 53 Government respondents, there were 12 who
indicated that they had dealt with contractors who had
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terminated pension plans. One of them indicated that the
termination of the pension plan did not affect the costs
allocated to his government contracts. Seven respondents
were unable to provide data regarding the magnitude of the
adjustments, mostly due to pending negotiation and/or
litigations. The remaining respondents reported adjustments
ranging from $2.9 million to $45 million. One respondent,
who indicated his branch has dealt with several terminated
pension plans, reported that "most contracts have been
adjusted downward. . . . However, there is nothing in
either the CAS or FAR to directly deal with this subject."
The significant number of respondents who were
unable to determine the effects of the terminated pension
plans, together with the comment quoted above, indicates
that each of the cases of terminated pension plans is being
treated as an individual occurrence as far as determining
the impact on contract prices.
By looking at the raw data one may get the
impression that there is a large discrepancy between the
number of industry respondents and government respondents
that have dealt with terminated pension plans. However, one
must realize that the industry respondents each have one
company to consider, while the Government respondents have,
in some instances, much larger samples of companies to
observe.
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2. Over funded Pens ion Plans .
The second group of questions dealing with pension
plan accounting was constructed to produce information
regarding the incidence of overfunded pension plans, the
possibility of this condition creating conflicts with
respect to the CAS, and the extent to which this condition
affected the pension cost allocated to government contracts.
The questions included in this area and the
responses received are as fol lows:
Question 5. (Industry) Does your company have an
overfunded pension plan?
YES = 23 (47.92*)
NO = 24 (50.00%)
INCOMPLETE = 1 (2.08%)
Question 5. (Government) Are there any contractors you
deal with, who have an overfunded pension plan?
YES = 30 (56.60%)
NO = 6 (20.00%)
DON'T KNOW = 10 (18.87%)
Question 6. (Government) If so, has this overfunded
condition affected the pension cost allocated to your
contracts?
YES = 18 (60.00%)
NO = 6 (20.00%)
DON'T KNOW = 6 (20.00%)
Question 6. (Industry) If so, is this overfunded pension
plan raising any problems with respect to the CAS?
YES = 8 (34.78%)
NO = 15 (65.22%)
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Question 9. (Government) If you have dealt with
contractors with overfunded pension plans, has this
condition created any conflicts with the CAS?
YES = 12 (40.00%)
NO = 15 (50.00%)
DON'T KNOW = 3 (10.00%)
Both Industry and Government respondents who stated
that overfunded pension plans had created conflicts were
asked what was the nature of the conflicts. Government
respondents who indicated that the overfunded pension plans
had affected their contracts prices were asked for the
magnitudes of such effects, both in dollar amounts and as
percentages of total contracts. Only limited responses were
received for these questions, as will appear in the
following discussion.
Of the 4-8 industry respondents, 23 companies
reported that their pension plans were overfunded. Of
these, 15 indicated that they were not having any conflicts
with the CAS. The conflicts that the remaining eight
respondents mentioned fall into two categories. First, the
Government (DCAA) has insisted that companies with an
overfunded pension plan enter into agreements that will
insure credit to the government for part of the overfunding.
Second, there are differences in treatment between the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and the CAS with respect to
overfunded pensions. For example, in some instances
contributions to overfunded pension plans are not tax
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deductible. However, to ensure future allocability of this
cost under CAS, the contribution must be made every year
regardless of the IRC position of the matter. The
differences are being widened, now that the 1986 Tax Reform
Act prescribes a 10% penalty for funding in excess of
funding requirements, beginning in 1987. [31]
Of the 53 Government respondents, 30 reported that
they had been involved with contractors whose pension plans
were overfunded. Of these 30, six indicated that the
overfunding condition did not have any effect on the cost
allocation to their contracts, and six others reported that
they did not know if there was any effect. The remaining 18
respondents indicated that the pension costs allocated to
their contracts were affected. The adjustments made to
contracts vary in magnitude from $944,000 to $77 million and
from 0.25* to 4% of total contract prices. Such adjustments
reduce the prices of the government contracts. This
reduction is accomplished by obtaining agreements from
contractors with overfunded plans. One of the Government
respondents indicated that, in September 1986, Under
Secretary of Defense Wade issued a letter to field offices
requesting that Contracting Officers "get a signed agreement
from contractors" to secure rights to the termination gains
as well as to ensure that contractors who had a continuing




Of the 30 Government respondents who have dealt with
overfunded pension plans, 12 indicated that they have
encountered some conflicts due to the overfunding
conditions. The conflicts that were noted deal primarily
with the discrepancies between current regulations (such as
CAS and FAR) treatment of overfunded plans. The Government
responses also mentioned the extended negotiations in which
contract administrators have to engage, in an attempt to
secure termination gain-sharing agreements from contractors.
Since there is no regulation forcing contractors to sign
such agreements, very few have done so and those who have
did so under considerable pressure from the Government.
C. INSURANCE
Questions related to insurance were designed to gather
information to determine if the existence of low discount
rates, prescribed by certain sates, had a significant effect
on the allocation of insurance costs to government
contracts
.
The question included in this area and the responses are
as foil ows
:
Question 1. (Industry) Has your company encountered any
case (or cases) where a state determined rate was used to
arrive at the insurance cost allocated to a government
contract?
YES = 3 (6.25%)
NO = 37 (77.08%)
DON'T KNOU = 5 (10.42%)
INCOMPLETE = 3 (6.25%)
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Question 1. (Government) Have you encountered any case
where your contracts' insurance allocations have been
affected by (a state prescribed rate which was lower than
the rate prescribed by the U.S. Treasury)?
YES = 6 (11.32%)
NO = 42 (79.25%)
DON'T KNOW = 5 (9.43%)
Industry respondents who stated that they had dealt with
state prescribed rates which were lower than the rate
prescribed by the U.S. Treasury were asked which states had
prescribed the rates and what the rates were. Government
respondents who had encountered this situation were asked
for the magnitude of the effect of the lower rates on their
contracts, both in dollar amounts and as a percentages of
total contract price. Only limited responses were received
for these questions, as will appear in the following
d iscussion:
Of the 48 industry respondents, three companies
indicated that they had encountered cases where the state
determined rate used was lower than that prescribed by the
treasury. Thirty-seven companies indicated they had not
encountered this case, five respondents were not sure, and
the remaining three did not complete this part of the
ques t ionnai re.
Of the 53 Government respondents, six reported that
they had encountered cases involving the lower state-
determine rates. Forty-two indicated that they had not
encountered the lower rates and five were not sure.
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The States that were mentioned as having prescribed
lower rates were California and Minnesota, with rates
varying from 3% of 6.25%. The effect encountered ranged
from 0.03% to 0.5% of the total contract price. One of the
Government respondents indicated that, although there are
some states that do use the lower discount rates, the
majority of the states do not and that the n . . .effect upon
costs to government contracts is not as great as one might
be inclined to believe." The limited evidence presented
here seems to support the previous statement. Furthermore,
the frequency of this occurrence appears to be very small.
D. GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
1 . Rea 1 i gnment of Segments
The first group of questions in this area was
designed to determine the frequency of realignment of
business segments and the impact that this practice has on
the allocation of G&A cost to government contracts.
Realignment of segments refers to changes in the firm's
organizational structure for reasons such as mergers or
acquisitions, divestitures of particular lines of business,
changes in management controls or consolidation of various
business functions into one.
The questions included in this area and the
responses received are as follows:
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Question 1. (Industry) Has your company changed its
definition of business segments?
YES = 10 (20.8%)
NO = 38 (79.17%)
Question 1. (Government) Have you encountered a case
where a contractor has realigned its business segments?
YES = 38 (71.70%)
NO = 14 (26.41%)
INCOMPLETE = 1 (1.89%)
Question 2. (Industry) If so, what was the reason for the
realignment of business units?
1. Change due to mergers = 3 (30.00%)
2. Change due to improve management control = 2
(20.00%)
3. Change to account for organizational restructure = 2
(20.00%)
4. Change to consolidate cost pools = 1 (10.00%)
5. Change to align operations with markets = 1 (10.00%)
6. Changes to account for off-site service contracts =
1 (10.00%)
Question 3. (Industry) Did the realignment change the
G&A cost allocated to government contracts?
YES = 8 (80.00%)
NO =2 (20.00%)
Question 2. (Government) If so, has the realignment
altered the cost allocated to your contracts?
YES = 21 (55.26%)
NO = 13 (34.21%)
DON'T KNOW = 4 (10.53%)
Both industry and Government respondents who stated
that business realignments had affected contract costs were
asked for the magnitudes of such effects, both as dollar
amounts and as percentages of total contracts. Only limited
responses were received for these questions, as will appear
in the following discussion.
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Of the 38 Government respondents who have dealt with
contractors who realigned their business segments, 21
indicated that the change had affected the costs allocated
to their contracts. Of these 21, eight were no able to
determine the magnitude of the change, and four indicated
that the change was immaterial. In the industry
questionnaire, of the ten respondents who indicated that the
realignment had caused some change, two were unable to
determine the magnitude of the change, while four reported
that the change was immaterial. Of the four industry
respondents who reported a material change, one reported a
shift of $400,000 from government contracts to commercial
contracts, while another expects reductions of as much as
60%. In the government questionnaire the magnitudes of the
changes range from $50,000 to $13.5 million, while the
change in percent of contract prices varies from less than
1% to 10%.
The frequency as well as the impact of realignment
of business segments appears to be significant, and
contracts and Government administrators now appear to be
handling each occurrence as it develops. This may be the
reason that several of the respondents were not able to
provide impact information. They may still be waiting for
the courts to settle the issue.
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2. Change of Al location Base
The second group of questions asked in the area of
G&A was designed to gather information to determine the
frequency of changes of allocation bases as well as the
impact that these changes have on government contracts.
The questions included in this area and the
responses received are as follows:
Question 5. (Industry) Has your company changed the base
used for allocating G&A cost to contracts?
YES = 10 (20.83*)
NO = 36 (75.00%)
INCOMPLETE = 2 (4.17%)
Question 5. (Government) Have you encountered any case
where a contractor changed its allocation basis for G&A
costs?
YES = 13 (24.53%)
NO = 36 (67.92%)
DON'T KNOW = 3 (5.6%)
INCOMPLETE = 1 (1.89%)
Question 6. (Industry) If so, what was the reason for
change?
1. To improve technique, previous base distorted
allocations = 2 (20.00%)
2. To account for mergers - 2 (20.00%)
3. To implement CAS 410 = 2 (20.00%)
4. To improve casual, beneficial relationship = 2
(20.00%)
5. To account for change in business conditions = 1
(10.00%)
6. Incomplete = 1 (10.00%)
Question 7. (Industry) Did the change alter the G&A cost
allocated to government contracts?
YES = 8 (80.00%)
NO = 2 (20.00%)
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Government respondents who indicated they had dealt
with changes in G&A allocations bases were asked for the
magnitude of the effect that the change in allocating base
had on their contract price, both as dollar amounts and as
percentage of total contract. Only limited responses were
received for these questions, as will appear in the
following discussion.
Of the 53 Government respondents, 13 indicated that
they had encountered cases where a contractor had changed
its allocation basis. Thirty-six respondents indicated that
they hadn't encountered such cases, four were not sure if
any of the contractors they dealt with had changed their
allocation bases, and one questionnaire was incomplete in
this area.
Of the 13 Government respondents who indicated they
had dealt with contractors who have changed their allocation
bases for G&A costs, one failed to include any data relating
to the magnitude of the change and four indicated that the
magnitude of the change was unknown to them. Three of the
13 indicated that the effect on the costs allocated to their
contracts was negligible. The remaining five indicated that
the effect ranged in magnitude from $205.00 to $2.7 million
and that the percentage effect on the total contract price
varied from IX to 7%.
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Of the ten companies which reported having changed
their allocation base, eight indicated that the change
altered the allocation of G&A cost to government contracts.
Of these eight one reported that the change was not
material. The other seven respondents did not include
information with respect to the magnitude of the effect.
The remaining two which indicated a change in G&A allocating
base reported no change in the allocation to government
contracts. However, one of the companies which reported no
change indicated that the reason was because the company's
sales volume is virtually 100% government contracts and,
although the total price to the Government did not change,
the distribution among the different contracts did change.
The change in G&A allocation base appears to be
significant both with respect to the frequency of occurrence
(approximately 20%) and in the impact on government
contracts.
E. WAIVERS
The questions in this area were designed to determine
how often waivers to the CAS are granted, what the reasons
for the waivers area, and who grants the waivers.
The questions included in this area and the responses
received are as follows:
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Question 1. (Industry) Has your company ever received a
waiver of the CAS?
YES = 3 (6.25*)
NO = 45 (93.75%)
Question 1. (Government) Have you been involved with the
granting of waivers to the CAS to any contractor?
YES = 2 (3.77%)
NO = 49 (92.46%)
INCOMPLETE = 2 (3.77%)
Industry and Government respondents who indicated that
they had dealt with waivers were asked to comment on the
reasons for the waivers. Industry respondents were also
asked who had granted the waivers.
Of the 48 industry respondents, three companies reported
having received waivers to the CAS. The reasons given for
the waivers are the following three:
1. The company is a sole source subcontractor, who was
granted a waiver by the procurement agency.
2. Waiver granted to the company for a "U.S. Treasury
Statue of Liberty coin contract for advertising."
3. The company is a regulated utility with waivers
granted by various Government agencies.
Of the 53 Government respondents, two indicated having
dealt with waivers for the following reasons: (1) to
exclude a contract from the total cost input base, and (2)
to relax a disclosure statement requirement for a Canadian
firm subject to CAS. One of the Government questionnaires
was returned incomplete.
The frequency of occurrence of waivers does not appear
to be of significant consequence.
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F. CAPITALIZATION OF TANGIBLE ASSETS
The questions in this area were designed to collect the
opinion of contractors and Government contract
administrators with respect to the need for changing the
tangible assets capitalization limit prescribed by CAS 404.
Currently CAS 404 provides a $1000 monetary limit, over
which expenditures for tangible assets with useful lives of
at least two years must be capitalized.
The questions included in this area and the responses
received are as follows:
Question 1. (Industry) Do you believe that the monetary
limits prescribed by CAS 404 should be changed?
YES = 23 (47.92%)
NO = 17 (35.42*)
DON'T KNOW = 7 (14.58*)
OTHER = 1 (2.08*)
Question 1. (Government) Do you believe that the
monetary limits prescribed by CAS 404 should be changed?
YES = 21 (39.62*)
NO = 19 (35.85*)
DON'T KNOW = 11 (20.76*)
INCOMPLETE = 1 (2.08*)
Question 2. (Industry) If so, should they be lowered or
raised?
RAISED = 21 (87.50*)
LOWERED = (0.00*)
OTHER = 3 (12.50*)
Question 2. (Government) If so, should they be lowered or
ra i sed?
RAISED = 19 (90.48*)
LOWERED = 2 (9.52*)
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Question 3. (Industry) What do you believe is now a
reasonable monetary limit for the capitalization of
tangible assets?
1000 = 17 (35.41%) - no change
$1500 = 3 (6. 25%)
1500-2000 = 3 (6.25%)
$2000 = 3 (6.25%)
$2500 = 2 (4.17%)
$3000 = 1 (2.08%)
$5000 = 7 (23.53%)
DON'T KNOW = 6 (12.50%)
Question 3. (Government) What do you believe is now a
reasonable monetary limit for the capitalization of
tangible assets?
NO DOLLAR LIMIT = 1 (1.89%)
$200 = 1 (1.89%)
$1000 = 19 (35.85%) - no change
$1500 = 1 (1.89%)
$1500-2000 = 1 (1.89%)
$2000 = 2 (3.77%)
$2000-2500 = 1 (1.89%)
$2500 = 3 (5.66%)
$5000 = 7 (13.20%)
$10000 = 2 (3.77%)
DON'T KNOW = 1 (1.89%)
Of the 48 industry respondents, 23 companies indicated
that there was a need to change the monetary limits imposed
by CAS 404. All of the industry respondents who believe
that the limits should be changed agree that they should be
rai sed
.
Of the 53 Government respondents, 20 indicated that
the limits should be changed. Of these 20, two indicated
that they should be lowered. One of these suggested that the
appropriate limit should be $200.00, while the other
indicated that the dollar limit should be abolished and the
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expected life of the asset should be the only criterion.
The remaining 18 respondents agreed that the limits in CAS
404 needed to be raised.
Three industry respondents proposed different methods to
establish the monetary limits. They included the following
comments
:
1. There should be two categories: Large business $1000
and Small Business $500.
2. Limits should keep up with inflation at a minimum.
3. Limits should be raised to a higher amount-- especia 1 1
y
for software capitalization.
The information collected appears to support the need
for an increase in the monetary limit of CAS 404.
G. GENERAL
1. I s _There a Need For a CASB?
The first group of questions in this area was
designed to collect the opinion of contracts and Government
contract administrators with respect to the need for an
entity to assume all or at least some of the
responsibilities of the CASB.
The questions included in this area and the
responses received are as follows:
Question 1. (Industry) Do you feel there is a need for
an entity to assume ALL the responsibilities of the Cost
Accounting Standards Board (CASB)?
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YES = 24 (50.00%)
NO = 17 (35.42%)
DON'T KNOW = 6 (12.50%)
INCOMPLETE = 1 (2.08%)
Question 1. (Government) Do you feel there is a need for
an entity to assume ALL the responsibilities of the Cost
Accounting Standards Board (CASB)?
YES = 35 (66.04%)
NO = 14 (26.41%)
DON'T KNOW = 3 (5.66%)
INCOMPLETE = 1 (1.89%)
Question 2. (Government) If no, do you feel there is a
need for an entity to assume SOME of the responsibilities
of the CASB?
YES = 7 (50.00%)
NO = 7 (50.00%)
Question 2. (Industry) If no, do you feel there is a
need for an entity to assume SOME of the responsibilities
of the CASB?
YES = 8 (47.06%)
NO = 8 (47.06%)
DON'T KNOW = 1 (5.88%)
The relative number of respondents in both groups
that indicated the need for an entity to assume all the
responsibilities of the CASB does not suggest any difference
of opinion between the two groups. There is also a similar
view in the two groups as to the need for an entity to
assume some of the responsibilities of the CASB.
Both industry and Government respondents who stated
there was a need for an entity with SOME of the
responsibilities of the CASB were asked to comment on which
specific responsibilities should be included.
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The industry respondents who indicated the need for
a body with some of the responsibilities of the CASB listed
the following responsibilities as those which they believe
should be entrusted to a administrative agency:
a. Granting of waivers
b. Interpretation of standards
c. Changes to adapt existing standards to changing
condi t ions
.
d. Issuance of uniform guidance
e. Updating/eliminating outdated economic factors.
The Government respondents who indicated that some
responsibilities of the CASB should be given to somebody
listed the following responsibilities:
a. Interpretation of existing standards.
b. Monitoring and adjustment of specific limits.
c. Consideration or specific standards for rescission.
d. Clarification of existing standards.
2. Admini strat ion of the CAS
The second group of questions in this area was
designed to collect opinion from the contractors and
Government contract administrators with respect to an
appropriate entity to administer the CAS. A question was
also included to determine the familiarity of the
respondents with OoD's initiative to amend the CAS.
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The questions included in this area and the responses
received are as follows:
Question 4. (Industry) Are you aware of the Department
of Defense (DoD) initiative to amend the CAS?
YES = 32 (66.67%)
NO = 13 (27.08%)
INCOMPLETE = 3 (6.25%)
Question 4. (Government) Are you aware of the Department
of Defense (DoD) initiative to amend the CAS?
YES = 32 (60.38%)
NO = 19 (35.85%)
INCOMPLETE = 2 (3.77%)
Question 5. (Industry) Who do you feel would be the
proper administrator of the CAS?
DoD s 2 (4. 17%)
GAO = 6 (12. 15%)
NEW CASB = 20 (41.67%)
OTHER = 5 (10.42%)
NOBODY = 7 (14.58%)
DON'T KNOW = 6 (12.50%)
INCOMPLETE = 2 (4. 17%)
Question 5. (Government) Uho do you feel would be the
proper administrator of the CAS?
DoD = 11 (20.75%)
GAO = 6 (11.32%)
NEW CASB = 19 (35.85%)
OTHER = 4 (7.55%)
NOBODY = 4 (7.55%)
DON'T KNOW = 6 ( 11.32%)
INCOMPLETE = 3 (5.66%)
As described in Chapter II section I. DoD has made
some attempts to amend the CAS. Of the 48 industry
respondents, 32 indicated that they were award of DoD's
intentions to amend the CAS. Thirteen indicated that they
were not award of these developments, and three
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questionnaires were returned incomplete in this area. Of
the 53 Government respondents, 32 indicated that they were
aware of the DoD's intentions to amend the CAS. Nineteen
responded that they were no aware of these developments, and
there were three questionnaires incomplete in this area.
When asked whom they believed should administer
the CAS, the data point out some similarities as well as
some differences. The institution which the majority of
both surveyed groups selected to administer the standards is
a new CASB (Industry 41.67% and Government 35.85%). Both
groups again indicated about the same preference for the
General Accounting Office (industry 12.5% and Government
11.32%) and about the same degree of uncertainty (industry
10.42% and Government 11.54%). The two notable differences
found are the following: (1) Industry indicated DoD only
4.17% of the time, while 20.75% of Government agents
selected DoD--second only to a new CASB. (2) The second
choice for industry was "nobody", with 14.58% of the
respondents indicating that there was no need for an
administrator of the CAS. Government, on the other hand,
indicated "nobody" only 7.55% of the time.
Industry respondents indicated that an "other"
entity should administer the standards 10.42% of the time.
Some of the choices that were suggested as the "other entity
are as foil ows
:
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a. A body similar to FASB.
b. An independent body with industry representation.
c. A new CASB with enlarged responsibilities to include
a 1 1 owabi 1 i ty.
Government respondents selected "other" 7.55* of the
time, and their suggested entities are as follows:
a. Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).
b. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP).
c. The Federal Acquisition Council.
d. An independent agency established by Congress.
The data suggest that industry in general favors
some independent body as the administrator of the CAS.
Government, on the other hand, favors a government agency.
H. OPEN-ENDED QUESTION
Both questionnaires had the following open-ended
question included in them:
Are there any other problems that you have encountered
with the CAS that were not covered in this questionnaire?
(Please describe briefly.)
Of the 48 industry respondents, 18 included additional
comments, and of the 53 Government respondents, 17
responded to the open-ended question.
Some of the comments provided by both groups were
collected into the broad themes presented below.
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1.
Need _f or_Gu i dance and C 1 ar i f i cat i on
One of the problems cited by both sides was the
difficulties encountered in the daily interpretation of the
standards. These comments range from short statements
declaring the standards "vague" to several more elaborate
ones. For example one industry respondent commented that:
There are no specific rules in CAS on cost impacts and
materiality. Therefore, each ACO, DCAA auditor and CACO
has different interpretations on materiality and the
administration of cost impacts.
A Government respondent stated that "better guidance
related to cost impacts. . . " was needed. Another Govern-
ment respondent offers the following possible solution:
"Many potential ASBCA cases could be di sposi t ioned prior to
a final decision if an independent CASB existed to provide
informal opinions, guidance and revised standards."
2. Lack _of Agreement wi th Other Regu 1 at ions
Some comments were made with respect to the fact
that CAS treats certain costs elements differently from
other government regulations. For example, a Government
respondent commented "Guidelines for depreciation in CAS 409
do not agree with the current administration depreciation
policies." An industry respondent cited as a problem the
accounting for and allocating of state and local taxes.
3. General Attitudes
Both groups included comments that indicate that
there is an antagonistic approach to their relationship. One
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of the industry respondents stated that the "general
attitude that business is bad guys needs to change so that
quality products can be produced without fear that
honest mistakes could result in criminal prosecution." On
the other hand, several Government respondents included
comments that contractors view the CAS as means to add to
the price of a contract.
4. DCAA1 nt erf ace
The largest number of related comments in the open
ended question dealt with the role that DCAA has in the
process. Industry respondents tended to view the role of
DCAA as a "militant" organization with "tendencies to
develop new and unusual interpretations of CAS." Government
respondents complained about the difficulty of obtaining
both "timely" and "continuous" review of disclosure
statements from DCAA.
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS.
The basic research question of this project was: What,
if any, problems for industry and/or for defense agencies
have resulted from the abolition of the CASB? Subsidiary
questions included:
1. How serious are these problems?
2. Are there any cases in which the absence of the CASB
provides an advantage or a disadvantage to either the
contractor or the government agency?
3. How are contractors and the agencies handling areas
of contention?
B. FINDINGS
The objective of this study was to collect data related
to several defense contract cost accounting issues that may
have arisen in the absence of the Cost Accounting Standards
Board. The following findings and conclusions were derived
from the questionnaire responses received from defense
contracting companies and from contracting personnel in the
Defense Contract Administration Service.
1 . Pens i ons
The evidence received suggests that the frequency of
occurrence of a firm terminating its pension plan is, at
best, moderately significant. Furthermore, the effect of
the termination on contract price is difficult to appraise
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because the majority of respondents were not able to provide
this information, since they are still waiting for
settlements of negotiation or litigations.
The evidence received suggests that the incidence of
overfunded pension plans is significant. Overfunding is
determined by measuring the actuarial value of assets held
by the plan against the present value of the accumulated
benefits. If a pension plan is overfunded, no further
contributions are allowed as costs of government contracts.
Furthermore, CAS 413 provides for actuarial gains resulting
from overfunding to be amortized over a period of 15 years.
Finally, the FAR requires annual payments into a pension
plan in order to maintain allowability. This complex of
varied regulations has resulted in potential conflicts and
controversy.
2. 1 nsurance
The evidence collected suggest that very few
contractors and government contract administrators have
encountered cases dealing with artificially low discount
rates required by a few states for use in settling
insurance claims. The impact of these low rates on
government contracts appears to be negligible.
3. Genera 1 and Administrative
The evidence received suggests that the number of
contractors who realign their business segments is
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significant. These realignments occur because of various
reasons, such as firms reorganizing after mergers or
acquisition or management's attempt to improve their
internal control systems. However, the impact on the cost
allocated to government contracts does not appear to be very
s i gni f icant
.
There is also a significant number of contractors
who have changed their G&A allocation bases. CAS 410
provides guidance with respect tot he appropriate base to be
used, and section 332 of the CAS allows changes in
allocation base as long as no increase in cost is charged to
the contract without the Government's approval. The
evidence suggest that, even though the changes in allocation
bases are significant, their impact is not. However, the
significant number of cases may suggest an increase in
negotiation and administration requirements.
4. Wa i vers
The evidence received indicates that there is a very
small number of waivers to the CAS processed. The data also
suggest that the waivers were processed without any
significant complication. These findings suggest that there
may not be any great advantage gained by transferring the
waiver authority of the CASB to agencies such as DoD, since
these agencies already are able to dispose of the few
waivers required without difficulty.
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5.
Capital izationof Tang ib 1 e_Assets
A significant number of contractors and government
administrators indicated that the monetary limits specified
by CAS 404 needed to be raised. The most prevalent level
suggested by those who believe the limits should be raised
was $5000. However, more respondents favored retention of
the current $1000 limit than any single change.
6. A New CASB
The opinions obtained suggest that there is a need
for an entity tasked with the maintenance and administration
of the CAS. Over half of the contractors and government
agents who answered the questionnaire indicated that there
is a need for a body vested with a 1
1
the responsibilities
previously held by the CASB. Of those who do not believe
there is a need for a full-fledged board, a significant
group indicated that in their opinion there is a need for an
entity with limited responsibilities. The clear choice, of
both contractors and government agents, for a body to
administer the CAS is a new Board. However, the two groups
do not agree on the alternatives. In general, contractors
favor some type of independent body, and government agents
lean towards a government agency.
A significant number of all respondents were aware
of the DoD initiative to amend the CAS. Contractors
overwhelmingly disapprove of DoD administering the CAS.
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However, although not a majority, a significant number of
government agents chose DoD as the appropriate administrator
of the standards.
Among the contractor respondents there is a
significant group who believes that there is no need for a
body to administer the CAS.
7. Contractor -Government Re lationship
Comments obtained from respondents suggest that the
relationship between contractors and the Government is based
in shared mistrust. Contractors complain that government
agents always picture industry as "bad guys", while at the
same time they describe the Government's role as capricious
and narrow-minded. Government respondents, on the other
hand, claim that contractors use the standards as a mean to
increase the costs they can charge to the Government.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the findings of this study, the following
actions are recommended:
1. The potential increase in negotiation and litigation
that was suggested shows, may be in part, the result
of poor or conflicting guidance provided by the
procurement agencies. For example, conflicts appear
to exist between FAR and CAS with respect to the
treatment of overfunded pension plans. It is
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recommended that fair and consistent policies be
developed to minimize the conflicts that arise from
independent solutions to recurring situations. This
guidance should be developed jointly by DoD, DCAA and
industry representatives such as CODSIA, AIA etc. The
implementation of this action would help reduce the
number of cases that need to be resolved by the ASBCA
and the courts. It also may serve to reduce the
antagonistic attitudes that are encountered at all
levels of defense contracting
2. Many of the disagreements between Government and
contractors come from issues which the CASB did not
address. It is recommended that the Congress
establishes a body empowered, at the very least, with
limited maintenance and administrative responsibili-
ties for the CAS. Congressman LaFa 1 ce ' s proposal
appears to be a step in the right direction of
providing an entity capable of supplying the guidance
that both contractors and government agents feel is
needed. The creation of the new board should deal
with issues of placement, industry representation, and
proper definition of its role. This action would
serve to provide fair and continuous guidance for the
proper resolution of emergent conflicts.
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D. CONCLUSIONS
Several issues were studied and a few of them may be
considered problems. These problems were not caused by the
abolition of the CASB per se, however. They arose because
of changes in economic condi t ions--such as rising investment
revenues leading to overfunded pension plans and continued
inf 1 at ion--and the CAS had no provisions to deal with such
changes. Several contractors and government contract
administrators have encountered problems dealing with the
issues generated by terminated and overfunded pension plans,
as well as differences encountered when dealing with
realigned business units and changed allocation bases.
Potentially the largest problem of all seems to be the
frustration of both parties in dealing with each other in an
antagonistic manner without an unbiased intermediary to
limit and defuse controversy. On the other hand, several of
the issues originally considered do not appear to be
problems— such as the handling of waivers and the state-
prescribed discount rate for insurance claims.
The seriousness of the problems varies, but generally
they are not very substantial if one only measures the
magnitude of the effects on contract prices. The problems
may be more significant if they increase the administrative
load measurably.
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Neither contractors nor Government have gained a
definite advantage from any of these problems. However,
each sees the other as having an unfair advantage. For
example, after taking their cases to courts over the
distribution of pensions gains, those gains are distributed.
However, each side continues to claim that the other side
acquired more than it deserved.
Most conflict resolution appears to be done in the
courts. This is not the best way to resolve differences in
the procurement arena, since it adds time and cost to the
process.
In conclusion, since the demise of the CASB there have
been several economic changes which have led to differences
between contractors and government representatives. Many of
the participants in this study feel that a body with at
least some of the responsibilities of the CASB would reduce
the problems, as long as this body could be created with an
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CAS 401. Consistency in estimating and reporting costs.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this cost accounting standard is to
insure that each contractor's practices used in estimating
costs for a proposal are consistent with cost accounting
practices used by him in accumulating and reporting costs.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1972
CAS 402. Consistency in allocating costs incurred for the
same purpose.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to require that
each type of cost is allocated only once and on only one
basis to any contract or other cost objective.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1972
CAS 403. Allocation of home office expenses to segments.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to establish
criteria for allocation of the expense of a home office to
the segments of the organization based on the beneficial or
causal relationship between such expenses and the receiving
segments.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1973
CAS 404. Capitalization of tangible assets
PURPOSE: This standard requires that, for purposes of cost
measurements, contractors establish and adhere to policies
with respect to capitalization of tangible assets which
satisfy criteria set forth in this standard.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1973
CAS 405. Accounting for unallowable costs.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to facilitate the
negotiation, audit, administration and settlement of
contracts by establishing guidelines covering the cost
accounting treatment to be accorded identified unallowable
costs
.
EFFECTIVE DATE: April 1, 1974
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CAS 406. Cost accounting period.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria for the selection of the time periods to be used as
cost accounting periods for contract cost estimating,
accumulating and reporting
EFFECTIVE DATE; July 1, 1974
CAS 407. Use of standard cost for direct labor and direct
mater ia 1
.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria under which standard costs may be used for
estimating, accumulating and reporting costs of direct
material and direct labor and to provide criteria relating
to the establishment of standards, accumulation of standard
costs and accumulation and disposition of variances from
standard costs.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 1974
CAS 408. Accounting for costs of compensated personal
absence.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to improve, and
provide uniformity in the measurement of costs of vacation,
sick leave, holiday and other compensated personal absence
for a cost accounting period, and thereby increase the
probability that the measured costs are allocated to the
proper cost objectives.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1975
CAS 409. Depreciation of tangible capital assets.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria and guidance for assigning costs of tangible
capital assets to costs accounting periods and for
allocating such costs to cost objectives within such periods
in an objective and consistent manner.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 1975
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CAS 410. Allocation of business unit general and
administrative expenses to final cost objectives.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria for the allocation of business unit general and
administrative expenses to business unit final cost
objectives based on their beneficial or causal
re 1 at ionshi ps
.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 1976
CAS 411. Accounting for acquisition costs of material.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria for the accounting of acquisition costs of material
and includes provisions on the use of inventory costing
methods
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 1976
CAS 412. Composition and measurement of pension costs.
PURPOSE: This standard establishes the basis on which
pension costs shall be assigned to cost accounting periods
and provides guidance for determining and measuring the
components of pension cost.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 1976
CAS 413. Adjustment and allocation of pension costs.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
guidance for adjusting pension cost by measuring actuarial
gains and losses and assigning such gains and losses to cost
accounting periods.
EFFECTIVE DATE: March 10, 1978
CAS 414. Cost of money as an element of the cost of
facilities capital.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to establish
criteria for the measurement and allocation of the cost of
capital committed to facilities as an element of contract
cost
.
EFFECTIVE DATE: October 1, 1976
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CAS 415. Accounting for the cost of deferred compensation.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria for the measurement of the cost of deferred
compensation and the assignment of such costs to cost
accounting periods.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 10, 1977
CAS 416. Accounting for insurance costs.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria for the measurement of insurance costs, the
assignment of such costs to cost accounting periods, and
their allocation to cost objectives.
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 10, 1979
CAS 417. Cost of money as an element of the cost of capital
assets under construction.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to establish
criteria for the measurement of the cost of money
attributable to capital assets under construction,
fabrication or development as an element of the cost of
those assets.
EFFECTIVE DATE: December 15, 1980
CAS 418. Allocation of direct and indirect costs.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide for
consistent determination of direct and indirect costs, to
provide criteria for the accumulation of indirect costs, and
to provide guidance for the selection of allocation
measures based on the beneficial or causal relationship
between indirect cost pools and cost objectives
EFFECTIVE DATE: September 20, 1980
CAS 420. Accounting for independent research and
development costs and bid and proposal costs.
PURPOSE: The purpose of this standard is to provide
criteria for the accumulation of independent research and
development costs and bid and proposal costs and for the
allocation of such costs to cost objectives based on the
beneficial or causal relationship.





The enclosed questionnaire will be used to gather
additional data for my master thesis at the Naval
Postgraduate School. I request that you take 30 minutes
to answer it and return it in the envelope provided.
I will use the survey data to help determine the
impact that the lack of a Cost Accounting Standards Board
has had on the allocation of indirect cost pools
to negotiated government contracts.
The survey emphasizes several issues that were raised
during interviews that I conducted with DoD, DCAA, and
industry personnel. However, an open-ended question is
included to cover issues that you may have encountered and
feel deserve attention.
The survey does not include any personal
identification, and I will not use the data to quote anyone
directly. If you desire a copy of the survey results please
include a note with your name and address and I will make
sure that you receive it. I sincerely appreciate your
ass i stance.






Because of the changes in the economic environment,
recently some concerns have been raised over the treatment
of pension cost under the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS),
with specific references to overfunded pension plans and the
termination of plans.
1. Has your company terminated a pension plan?
Yes
No
2. If so, did the termination of the plan affect the cost




3. If so, what was the magnitude of the adjustment directly
attributable to the termination of the plan?
4. What percentage of your company's total government
contracts, was that adjustment?
5. Does your company have an overfunded pension plan
Yes
No
6. If so, is this overfunded pension plan raising any
problems with respect to the CAS?
Yes
No
Don ' t Know
7. If so, briefly, what is the nature of the problem?
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B. INSURANCE
CAS 416 prescribes that the insurance cost of the period
for se 1 f- insurance will be the present value of future
payments, discounted at a rate prescribed by the state of
jurisdiction over the claim. If no such rate is prescribed
by the state, then the rate used is to be determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury. Since some states (without CAS in
mind) prescribed rates that are low in comparison with the
rate prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, some
agencies claim that the insurance costs allocated to their
contracts are inflated.
1. Has your company encountered any case (or cases) where a
state determined rate was used to arrive at the insurance




2. If so, what was (were) the discount rate(s) used?
3. What state(s) had jurisdiction over the claim(s)?
C. GENERAL L ADMINISTRATIVE




2. If so, what was the reason for the realignment off
business units?





4. If so, what was the magnitude of the adjustment?
5. Has your company changed the base used for allocating
G&A cost to contracts?
Yes
No
6. If so, what was the reason for the change?
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Don ' t Know
D. WAIVERS
1. Has your company ever received a waiver of the CAS?
Yes
No
2. What was the reason for the waiver?
3. Who granted the waiver?
E. CAPITALIZATION OF TANGIBLE ASSETS.
CAS 404 provides a $1000 monetary limit, over which
limit expenditures for tangible assets must be capitalized.
The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) raised that limit
from $500 to $1000 to reflect inflation. Now there are some
opinions that the present limits need to be revised again.
1. Do you believe that the monetary limits prescribed by CAS
404 should be changed?
Yes
No
Don ' t know
2. If so, should they be lowered or raised?
3. What do you believe is now a reasonable monetary limit
for the capitalization of tangible assets?
F. GENERAL
1. Do you feel there is need for an entity to assume ALL






2. If no, do you feel there is a need for an entity to
assume SOME of the responsibilities of the CASB?
Yes
No
Don • t Know
3. If so, which specific responsibilities?
A. Are you aware of the Department of Defense ( DOD
)
initiative to amend the CAS?
Yes
No






Nobody, there is no need
Don' t Know
6. Are there any other problems that you have encountered





Recently some concerns have been voiced over the
handling of pension costs under the Cost Accounting
Standards (CAS), with specific references to overfunded
pension plans and the termination of plans.




Don ' t Know
2. If yes, have your contracts been adjusted or have you




3. If so, what was the magnitude of the adjustment
allocated to your contracts after contractor terminated its
pension plan?
4. What percentage of the total contracts price were the
adjustments?




Don ' t know
6. If so, has this overfunded condition affected the
pension cost allocated to your contracts?
Yes
No
Don ' t Know
7. If so, what was the magnitude of the effect on your
contracts due to the overfunding of the plan?
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8. What percentages of the total contract prices were the
effects?
9. If you dealt with contractors with overfunded plans, has
this condition created any conflicts with the CAS?
Yes
No
Don ' t Know
10. If so, what was the nature of the conflicts?
B. INSURANCE
CAS 416 prescribes that the insurance cost off the
period for se 1 f - insurance will be the present value of
future payments, discounted at a rate prescribed by the
state of jurisdiction over the claim. If no such rate is
prescribed by the state, then the rate used is to be
determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. Since some
states (without CAS in mind) prescribed rates that are low
in comparison with the rate prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury, some agencies claim that the insurance costs
allocated to their contracts are inflated.
1. Have you encountered any case where your contractors'




2. If so, what are the magnitude of the effects that the
use of the state discount rate had on your contracts?
3. What percentage of the total contract price were the
effects on your contracts?
C. GENERAL & ADMINISTRATIVE
1. Have you encountered a case where a contractor has










3. If so, what was the magnitude of the change to your
contracts due to the realignment?
4. What percentage of the total contract prices were the
changes?
5. Have you encountered any case where a contractor changed




6. If so, what was the magnitude of the change of G&A cost
to your contracts due to the change in allocation basis?
7. What were the percent changes with respect to total
contract prices?
0. WAIVERS
1. Have you been involved with the granting of waivers to
the CAS to any contractor?
Yes
No
2. If you have been involved in granting waivers, please
briefly describe the reasons for the waivers.
E. CAPITALIZATION OF TANGIBLE ASSETS.
CAS 404 provides a $1000 monetary limit, over which
limit expenditures for tangible assets must be capitalized.
The Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) raised that limit
from *500 to $1000 to reflect inflation. Now there are some
opinions that the present limits need to be revised again.
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i. Do you believe that the monetary limits prescribed by CAS




2- If so, should they be lowered or raised?
3. What do you believe is now a reasonable monetary limit
for the capitalization of tangible assets?
F. GENERAL
1. Do you feel there is a need for an entity to assume ALL





2. If no, do you feel there is a need for an entity to
assume SOME of the responsibilities of the CASB?
Yes
No
Don ' t Know
3. If so, which specific responsibilities?
4. Are you aware of the Department of Defense (DOD)
initiative to amend the CAS?
Yes
No






Nobody, there is no need
Don ' t Know
6. Are there any other problems that you have encountered
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